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AN ESSAY FOR KEISHA (AND A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FORD)
BARBARA J. FLAGG*
Some years ago, for a law review article, I created a character named Keisha
1
Akbar. The article had to do with Title VII; Keisha made her appearance in
order to illustrate one pervasive form of employment discrimination. In the end,
the article set forth two alternative doctrinal interpretations of Title VII, either of
which would provide a legal remedy for the particular form of race
discrimination that the fictional Keisha had suffered.
Keisha has reappeared in print a number of times in the past decade, twice
2
3
in other works of mine, and several times in the works of other scholars. In
general, both Keisha and her claim have been treated well in these publications,
even when their authors disagree with me on one or another point of Title VII
law. Now, however, Keisha’s claim has come under a more sustained attack, at
4
the hands of Professor Richard Ford. Initially in several articles, and more
5
recently in a book titled Racial Culture: A Critique, Ford has elaborated a thesis
questioning the utility for racial justice of at least one version of
multiculturalism.
It seems that for Ford the claim I fashioned for Keisha is an example of a
“rights-to-difference” proposal, a particular variety of legal recommendation
that is an instance of what he calls a larger “difference discourse.” The latter,
Ford asserts, “has the potential to stall egalitarian and humanist reforms and
6
deprive us of much of the exciting potential of cosmopolitan society.” Under
Ford’s analysis, Keisha could be harmed more than helped by my Title VII
remedy.
* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I thank Pauline Kim, Laura
Rosenbury, Terry Smith, and Peter Wiedenbeck for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
essay.
1. Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2010 (1995).
2. Barbara J. Flagg, Subtle Opposition, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 605, 605–06 (2003); Barbara
J. Flagg, On Selecting Black Women as Paradigms for Race Discrimination Analyses, 10 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 40, 42–43 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 646 (2005);
Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 529, 538 (2003); Theodore A. Schroeder, Fables of the Deconstruction: The Practical Failures of Gay
and Lesbian Theory in the Realm of Employment Discrimination, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 333, 357 n.151
(1998); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of Equality, 57 U. PITT.
L. REV. 363, 382–83 (1996).
4. See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (2003); see also Richard
T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
5. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE (2005).
6. Id. at 211.
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I have two somewhat contradictory reactions to Ford’s arguments. On the
one hand, I regard his presentation of my views as infuriatingly misleading. I
don’t think there is much fit at all between his account of “rights-to-difference”
proponents and my work. On the other hand, I do find many of his observations
concerning multiculturalism illuminating. I especially take his point that norms
of cultural pluralism may not be the best foundation on which to build remedies
for racial subordination. It has prompted me to rethink the normative
underpinnings of Keisha’s claim.
Hence this essay has two objectives. The first is to respond to Professor
Ford, insisting on some points that I think were set forth clearly enough in my
Title VII article that they should not have been misread, and clarifying others
that I now think might have been presented more intelligibly. The second
objective is to purge Keisha’s claim of its reliance on a norm of cultural
pluralism and see what remains. It turns out, I think, that to whatever extent one
sees my “models of Title VII liability” as doctrinal proposals, both emerge from
the process of normative reconstruction pretty much unscathed.
The essay proceeds in three parts. In the first I describe the salient points of
7
Professor Ford’s critique, and in the second I review my Title VII article. In both
of these sections I provide extensive quotations, for reasons that will become
apparent. The final section responds to Ford, first by comparing his claims about
my work with the work itself as I see it, and then by undertaking the project, for
which he has provided the impetus, of normatively refashioning Keisha’s claim.
I. PROFESSOR FORD’S CRITIQUE
My overview of Ford’s project begins with his own description of his book:
Chapters 1 and 2 describe the set of ideas, policies, and literature I wish to attack
and introduce the book’s central thesis: Group cultural difference—racial
culture—is a social discourse that produces rather than describes preexisting
group cultural differences. I argue that the “recognition” of group difference is
not an antidote to the forced assimilation of distinctive social groups. Instead the
two—recognition of difference and forced assimilation—are both part of a single
mechanism of oppression, a whipsaw dynamic that effectively produces and
punishes group difference, making assimilation both mandatory and
unavailable . . . .
Chapter 2 argues that racial and analogous social identities are never
autonomously adopted or intrinsic; they are always, at least in part, the effect of
this social regulation. . . . Chapter 2 suggests that, instead of presumptively
protecting the traits associated with groups that have suffered from pervasive
social and political oppression (which would reinforce the regulation that
produced the identities in the first place), anti-discrimination law should only
protect individuals from discrimination based on ascribed group membership or
status. I conclude that “cultural difference” conflicts, which concern traits or
conduct, are distinct from social struggles concerning racial and other ascribed
statuses.

7.

As this is not a book review; not all of Ford’s points are mentioned here.
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In chapter 3 I build on this conclusion and argue that political solidarity based
on a common relationship to oppression and domination is the appropriate
focus of (racial) identity politics and legal rights assertion; by contrast cultural
claims are more contestable on both descriptive and normative terms and
should be left to more fluid domains of conflict resolution such as social
dialogue, the democratic process and the market economy . . . .
Chapter 4 addresses the limits of civil rights law with respect to cultural
pluralism and group identity and suggests a direction for reform of antidiscrimination law consistent with my arguments above. The appropriate goals
underlying anti-discrimination law are to counter the social and economic
isolation of historically subordinated groups, which is produced by the
ascription of stigmatized status. Rights-to-group cultural difference are of
questionable legitimacy at best when evaluated in this pragmatic,
consequentialist manner. The chapter ends by suggesting approaches to cultural
difference and the expression of individual identity that would avoid the pitfalls
8
of difference discourse.

Thus, Ford presents both a positive and a negative program: On the negative
side, Ford criticizes proponents of “difference discourse,” defined as “a series of
claims, proposals and practices” that set forth, or undergird, “a set of moral and
legal arguments that promote what [Ford calls] ‘rights-to-difference.’ These
arguments hold that a just society could and should prohibit discrimination on
the basis of the [sic] cultural difference (thereby establishing a ‘right-todifference’) for the same reasons it should prohibit discrimination based on
9
statuses such as race.” On the positive program side, Ford sets forth his
preferred vision of multiculturalism and advances his own views on the
appropriate contours of antidiscrimination law. In my opinion, the two
programs are not equally successful; while Ford makes a number of solid and
10
useful points on the positive side, his “critique” of the proponents of
“difference discourse” and “rights-to-difference” is little more than a
disappointing caricature.
Ford’s discussion of “difference discourse” begins with a quotation from
11
the district court opinion in Rogers v. American Airlines, in which Rene Rogers,
an employee of American Airlines, challenged her employer’s grooming policy,
which prohibited her from wearing her hair in cornrows. The significant portion
of the quotation is as follows: “[T]he completely braided hair style, sometimes
referred to as corn rows, has been and continues to be part of the cultural and
12
historical essence of Black American women.” Ford objects that the plaintiff’s
reasoning—which was reproduced in the district court opinion—assumes (1)
that there is a distinctive Black culture, or Black women’s culture and (2) that
this culture is unitary. Ford argues that legal enforcement of Rogers’ complaint
constitutes “an intervention in a long-standing debate among African-Americans

8. Ford, supra note 5, at 20–21.
9. Id. at 4.
10. There are a few problems here as well, as I discuss below.
11. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
12. Id. at 232 (quoting Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 4–5,
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 577 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (No. 81 Civ. 4474)).
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about empowerment strategies and norms of identity and identification.”
Moreover, he says, enforcement of such a right can increase pressure on
members of the group in question to conform to the practice that gained legal
recognition, provide a disincentive for nonmembers of that group to behave
similarly, thus increasing racial disunity, and set precedent for other, even more
14
troubling racial distinctiveness claims.
Unproblematic as Ford’s assessment of the Rogers argument may be, it
unfortunately becomes a template for his presentation of all proponents of
“rights-to-difference.” Thus, under the heading “Rights-to-Difference Require an
Official Account of Group Difference,” Ford contends:
Rights-to-difference claims are presented as a simple matter of freeing
individuals and groups from a mainstream cultural hegemony. The conceptual
foundation of this claim is that there is a baseline of authentic behavior that
members of minority groups would engage in out of unfettered free choice, in
15
the absence of cultural hegemony.

This passage seems to suggest that rights-to-difference proponents must believe
in a relatively sharp distinction between mainstream and minority cultures
(cultural distinctiveness), and definitely suggests that such proponents must
believe in the unitary (“authentic”) nature of any given minority culture
16
(cultural essentialism).
Neither suggestion receives further support from Ford. Surely one could
adopt a vision of multiculturalism that understands cultural difference as fluid,
17
overlapping, and contingent (as does Ford himself ). He fails to support either
the descriptive claim that all proponents of cultural rights adopt the more rigid,
categorical conception of cultural difference, or the normative claim that any
rights-to-difference proposal would require such a conception. Along similar
lines, it clearly is possible to conceive of culture as a set of social practices,
norms, and ideologies that are internally varied, partially inconsistent, and
18
sometimes contested. Thus, Ford’s assertion that all rights-to-difference
proponents subscribe to a rigid and categorical understanding of culture—
adopting some form of cultural essentialism—either is descriptive of a
contingent fact or is a normative claim about the nature of legal rights. Here
again he fails to provide any support for either proposition.
Much of Ford’s critique of “rights-to-difference” focuses not on proposals
grounded in cultural pluralism, but on proposals grounded in conceptions of
identity. Ford uniformly conflates notions of difference among cultures with
notions of difference based on individual traits that vary along lines of social
19
identity. More precisely, Ford treats as indistinguishable proposals that, in one

13. Ford, supra note 5, at 25 (emphasis in original).
14. Id. at 25–27.
15. Id. at 70.
16. See also id. at 73, 79.
17. Id. at 156–62.
18. Id. at 23–27.
19. See, e.g., id. at 101 (“But then aren’t racially correlated traits—racial cultures—all potentially
proxies for racial status?”) Ford’s response to this rhetorical question is that racially correlated traits
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way or another, prohibit discrimination based on some sort of cultural
difference and proposals that, in one way or another, prohibit discrimination
20
based on traits linked in some manner to social identity. Though each might
well be brought under a general rubric of “difference discourse,” clearly there is
a conceptual distinction to be made between culture and individual traits, and it
is a distinction that has some significance if one is concerned primarily about
legal rights.
To illustrate the conceptual distinction: I can be a member of the same
culture as persons with whom I have almost no shared individual
characteristics, and I can share quite a few, even a great number of, individual
characteristics with persons who inhabit and are members of wholly different
21
cultures from mine. The payoff of the distinction for rights proponents is this: If
one wished to frame a “cultural right” proposal of some kind, one would need
some conception of “culture” (though it need not be a categorical notion; it
might, for example, be a functional definition), and some conception of
membership in a culture. For example, I can imagine trying to frame a right to
fish by gill-netting (which is otherwise prohibited) for individual Native people.
In order to do so, I would need some account of the relevant culture in order to
support a claim that members of that culture should have unique fishing rights,
and I would need some way to test cultural membership. In contrast, if one
wanted to frame some sort of legal protection for one or more individual traits,
one would need to specify the trait(s), but would not necessarily have to say
anything at all about the culture or social identity of persons bearing such traits.
Of course, many “trait discrimination” proposals are identity-trait proposals;
that is, they link the (desired to be) protected traits with some (desired to be)
protected social identity. Even in these instances, however, the proponent of
such a right would not have to be concerned about the culture of members of the
social category in question. Thus, if I wanted to frame some sort of individual
right for gay persons, I would need some definition of “gay,” which could be
framed in terms of some set of traits (if I wanted to theorize “gay” in that way),
but even so I wouldn’t have to specify, or even know anything about, gay
culture.
Ford systematically overlooks this distinction in his own presentation,
moving back and forth without pause between considerations having to do with
identity-linked traits and considerations having to do with culture. Consider this
sentence: “Rights-to-difference are premised on a belief that identity has a

should be seen as proxies if and only if they are so used intentionally. I quote the sentence, however,
to illustrate his tendency to treat “racially correlated traits” as identical to “racial cultures.”
20. He may do this because he thinks that all individual traits linked to social identity are so
linked by culture, but he’s not clear enough about any of these terms for me to form a fixed opinion
on what he says regarding this point. In any case, I think it evident that one could undertake a
project of valorizing some discredited social identity without making any claims at all regarding a
culture associated with that identity, and equally evident that one could describe and defend a
discredited social identity without reference to any particular set of individual traits. That is, projects
of “identity politics” do not necessarily require reference either to culture or to individual traits.
21. Of course there will be some overlap in both cases; I am not one of those theorists who
subscribe to a view of sharp cultural distinctiveness, and one most likely can find some shared
characteristics between any two individuals.
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relatively fixed content that can be protected by rights assertion: Rogers’s claim
was that cornrows were and had always been the cultural essence of black
22
womanhood . . . .” The second half of the sentence is about a cultural “essence”;
it has no necessary connection to a claim that “black woman” has some fixed
trait-based content. Perhaps the example itself contributes to Ford’s confusion: Is
23
wearing a cornrows a trait or a cultural practice?
Having thoroughly elided identity and culture, Ford applies the same
process of overgeneralization to the former as he did to the latter. “These
conceptions of identity share a crucial conceit: Social identities are things in the
24
world and/or reflections of things that can be taken note of as a matter of fact.”
In contrast to this “matter of fact” conception of identity, Ford sets forth his own
vision of identity as performance. Here again, however, Ford makes no effort to
support his claims that “rights-to-difference” proponents do not also ground
their analyses on understandings of identity as performance; there is not even an
attempt to name proponents or provide examples.
Finally, Ford tells us that “[r]ights-to-difference are informed by a
conception of rights as a limit of social and political power. The proposals
envision a legal right that will simply remove a source of repression, freeing the
25
underlying identity to develop without restriction.” Ford contrasts this
“negative rights” approach to his own, which understands rights as constitutive
as well as protective: “As policy, legal entitlements in general and especially
rights do not simply protect people from outside interference; they also channel
energies and shape perceptions about what is important, necessary and good in
life. Rights have a tutelary function; they send a message about what society
26
values.” Once more, there is no support offered for the claim that “rights-todifference” proponents subscribe to the “negative rights” conception, rather
than to Ford’s more sophisticated one.
Though Ford’s critique of “rights-to-difference” proponents is a conceptual
and substantive disaster, there nevertheless is more than a little good to be
found in his positive program. Its core, and most valuable, contribution is Ford’s
insistence on the distinction between racial culture and ascribed race, where the
27
latter is the bare fact of membership in a racial category, by social designation.
In Ford’s view, addressing domination and subordination that attach to ascribed
racial status is a proper aim of anti-discrimination law, but addressing “cultural
discrimination” is not.
Shorn of its negative program, Ford’s discussion of “difference discourse,”
broadly construed, also has a good deal to offer. Points such as the futility of
drawing sharp or absolute distinctions between cultures, the perils of a tendency

22. Ford, supra note 5, at 60.
23. I think the answer is that it’s both, and thus one who wants to create a framework for either
a culture-based or an identity-trait-based legal claim should think very carefully about how to go
about it. I don’t think Keisha’s claim is either culture-based or identity-trait-based. See infra text
accompanying notes 43–47.
24. Ford, supra note 5, at 61.
25. Id. at 68.
26. Id. at 69.
27. Id. at 93–94.

05__FLAGG.DOC

2/8/2007 2:02 PM

AN ESSAY FOR KEISHA

185

to see some aspects of any given culture as “authentic,” marking others as
“inauthentic,” and the value of understanding identity as social performance all
are sound and worth making, even if not for the first time. In addition, Ford
advances some interesting analyses of multiculturalism—especially if we read
him as a commentator on “multicultural” culture generally—and the role of law
28
vis-à-vis racial and cultural domination, considered separately. On the former
subject, I find especially engaging Ford’s presentation of the history of cultural
pluralism among civil rights advocates, his comments on institutional culture,
and his portrait of “cosmopolitan” pluralism. On the topic of law, Ford’s
comments on the inevitable distributive effects of any legal regime, on
understanding civil rights laws as at best a limited vehicle of social justice, and
on the social discipline function of law, though points also made elsewhere by
others, all add value to his critique of multiculturalism.
II. KEISHA IN CONTEXT
Keisha Akbar is a black woman; by profession, she is a scientist. In 1995 I
described Keisha and her employment difficulties in this way:
Keisha majored in biology at Howard University, and after graduation went to
work as the only black scientist at a small research firm dedicated to identifying
and developing environmentally safe agricultural products for commercial
uses. . . . Keisha excelled at the technical aspects of her work, but she brought to
it a much less assimilationist personal style. At first, her cultural differences had
no particular impact on her job performance. This changed, however, when the
once-small firm began to grow rapidly and reorganization into research
divisions became necessary. For the most part, the firm planned to elevate each
of the original members of the research team to positions as department heads,
but Keisha was not asked to head a department because the individuals
responsible for making that decision felt that she lacked the personal qualities
that a successful manager needs. They saw Keisha as just too different from the
researchers she would supervise to be able to communicate effectively with
them. The firm articulated this reasoning by asserting a need for a department
head who shared the perspectives and values of the employees under her
direction. When Keisha raised the possibility that her perceived differences
might be race-dependent, the decisionmakers replied that they would apply the
same conformity-related criteria to white candidates for the position of
29
department head.

Footnotes added the following information: “Keisha often wears clothing that
features African styles and materials, frequently braids her hair or wears it in a
natural style, and at times speaks to other black employees in the dialect
linguists designate ‘Black English,’ though she always uses ‘Standard English’
30
when speaking with whites”; “[a] principal reason for the decisionmakers’
perception that Keisha’s values were different from theirs was the fact that in

28. I don’t necessarily agree with all of Ford’s contentions, but I do find many of them
interesting.
29. Flagg, supra note 1, at 2011 (internal citations omitted).
30. Id. at 2011 n.4.
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lunchroom conversation she analyzed current events as instances of ‘racism’ far
31
more frequently than did her white coworkers.”
Though Keisha undeniably was the focus of the article in which she first
appeared, she was not alone. Keisha has a sister, Yvonne, who in fact was
introduced first, at the very beginning of the article:
Goodson, Badwin & Indiff is a major accounting firm employing more than five
hundred persons nationwide. Among its twenty black accountants is Yvonne
Taylor, who at the time this story begins was thirty-one years old and poised to
become the first black regional supervisor in the firm’s history. Yvonne attended
Princeton University and received an M.B.A. from the Kellogg Graduate School
of Management at Northwestern University. While employed at Goodson, she
was very successful in attracting new clients, especially from the black business
community. In all other respects her performance at the firm was regarded as
exemplary as well.
Yvonne always was comfortable conforming to the norms of the corporate
culture at Goodson, and in fact has been comfortable with “white” norms since
childhood. Her manner of speech, dress, and hairstyle, as well as many of her
attitudes and beliefs, fall well within the bounds of whites’ cultural expectations.
However, Yvonne may have adapted to the corporate culture too well. It is
common practice at Goodson to be less than absolutely precise in keeping
records of one’s billable hours. Instead, accountants generally estimate time
spent on clients’ accounts at the end of each day, and tend to err on the side of
over- rather than under[-]billing. On the rare occasions this practice is discussed,
it is explained in terms of the firm’s prestige in the business community; the
subtext is that clients should consider themselves fortunate to be associated with
Goodson at all. Like other young accountants, Yvonne at first attempted to keep
meticulous records, but she soon realized that others were surpassing her in
billable hours without spending more time actually at work. Consequently, and
consistent with her general pattern of conforming to prevailing norms, she
gradually adopted the less precise method.
Under Goodson’s promotion procedure, the decision whether to promote an
accountant to regional supervisor rests on senior partners’ evaluations of the
candidate’s accounting knowledge and skills and, to a lesser extent, on
assessments of her interpersonal skills solicited from clients and from peers in
the office in which she works. The reports on Yvonne’s accounting skills were
uniformly excellent. Comments from some peers had overtones of distance and
mild distrust suggesting that they were somewhat uncomfortable with Yvonne
as a black woman, but these comments fell far below the level necessary to raise
serious doubts about her interpersonal skills. However, several of Yvonne’s
clients took the occasion to register complaints about possible overbilling. The
firm launched an extensive investigation and eventually reached the conclusion
that Yvonne had been careless in her recordkeeping and that therefore she
should not be promoted at that time. As a practical matter, this episode ended
Yvonne’s prospects for advancement at Goodson; the firm has an informal
policy of not reconsidering an individual once she has been passed over for
promotion.

31.

Id. at 2011 n.5.
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Yvonne has a younger sister who, sometime during college, legally changed her
32
name from Deborah Taylor to Keisha Akbar . . . .

Yvonne played three roles in this introduction to the article. First, she
provided a means by which I could set forth and illustrate at the outset the
distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination as
a matter of Title VII law. Yvonne’s story exemplifies disparate treatment
discrimination because, as the footnotes explained, hers is a case of the
33
“differential application of legitimate employer expectations.” In contrast,
Keisha’s case, resting on the differential effects of seemingly neutral criteria,
presents a disparate impact problem. Second, the juxtaposition of Yvonne with
Keisha enabled me to make the point sub silentio that Keisha would not
necessarily have been better off had she conformed to white norms and
expectations; discrimination against people of color in a white-dominated world
takes many and varied forms. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Yvonne
allowed me to place Keisha’s self-presentation in a larger context of black
culture, one that did not assume that Keisha’s way of being was the only, or
best, way for a black person to be. Thus, though I said, “[a]s her decision to
change her name suggests, Keisha places an emphasis on her African heritage
34
that Yvonne does not . . . ,” a footnote carried an important caveat: “This is not
to suggest that Yvonne denies her African heritage, but only that she interprets
it differently; she sees being black as congruent with many of the norms of the
35
dominant culture.”
The article went on to feature Keisha, addressing the question whether Title
VII could be read to provide a remedy for the injury she suffered. I divided this
36
project into three analytic parts. First, because I hypothesized that the
decisionmakers in Keisha’s case would have genuinely believed that race had
nothing to do with their decision (as would many white readers), I wanted to
explain why I saw it as a case of “transparently white decisionmaking.” Second,
given that it was an instance of race-specific decisionmaking in the sense just
identified, I needed an argument that fundamental Title VII norms would reach
this form of race discrimination. Finally, because existing (judicially created)
doctrinal models of Title VII liability would not be adequate to provide a legal
remedy for Keisha, I set forth two new models, either of which would do so, and
I explored the advantages and disadvantages of each.
With respect to the first of these steps, I’d like to provide readers of this
essay the complete actual text and footnotes, as one portion of it figures
prominently in Professor Ford’s critique:
[I]n spite of the diametrically different cultural styles adopted by Yvonne and
[7]
Keisha, their stories have the same ending: Each encountered the glass ceiling

32. Id. at 2009–10 (internal citations omitted and alteration added).
33. Id. at 2010 n.2 (explaining that “[a] white male was promoted to regional supervisor in
Yvonne’s place. This accountant’s recordkeeping practices were not investigated in the same manner
as Yvonne’s; had that investigation taken place, it would have uncovered practices functionally
identical to hers.”) (alteration added).
34. Id. at 2010.
35. Id. at 2010 n.3.
36. There’s also a section that simply describes existing Title VII doctrine. See id. at 2015–30.
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at a relatively early stage of what should have been a very successful career. A
[9]
case can be made that both were disadvantaged because of race. Yvonne
would argue that there is no nonracial element of her performance or her
personal characteristics that could account for the way her recordkeeping
practices were singled out for special scrutiny, and therefore that race is left as
the most plausible explanation of the different treatment she received. Even if
the basis for the special treatment was unconscious, this is a relatively easily
understood form of discrimination: Yvonne’s contention would be that she was
treated differently from similarly situated others because of her race.
Keisha, on the other hand, arguably was given the same treatment that would
have been afforded anyone who was perceived as unable or unwilling to fit
smoothly into the corporate culture. Nevertheless, it can be argued that she too
was disadvantaged because of her race, in that the personal characteristics that
disqualified her from a management position intersect seamlessly with her selfdefinition as a black woman. I previously have characterized this form of
discrimination as an outgrowth of the transparency phenomenon:
White people externalize race. For most whites, most of the time, to think or
speak about race is to think or speak about people of color, or perhaps, at
times, to reflect on oneself (or other whites) in relation to people of color.
But we tend not to think of ourselves or our racial cohort as racially
distinctive. Whites’ “consciousness” of whiteness is predominantly
unconsciousness of whiteness. We perceive and interact with other whites as
individuals who have no significant racial characteristics. In the same vein,
the white person is unlikely to see or describe himself in racial terms,
perhaps in part because his white peers do not regard him as racially
distinctive. Whiteness is a transparent quality when whites interact with
whites in the absence of people of color. Whiteness attains opacity, becomes
apparent to the white mind, only in relation to, and contrast with, the
[10]
“color” of nonwhites.
Just as whites tend to regard whiteness as racelessness, the transparency
phenomenon also affects whites’ decisionmaking; behaviors and characteristics
associated with whites take on the same aura of race neutrality. Thus, white
people frequently interpret norms adopted by a dominantly white culture as
racially neutral, and so fail to recognize the ways in which those norms may be
[11]
in fact covertly race-specific. Keisha would argue that she was not promoted
because her personal style was found wanting when measured against a norm
[12]
that was in fact transparently “white.”
[7]

For discussions of differing cultural styles within the black community, see
LURE AND LOATHING: ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTITY, AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF
ASSIMILATION (Gerald Early ed., 1993) (containing essays by black intellectuals
and writers on black people’s struggle between nationalistic and assimilationist
models of collective identity); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., The Michael Jackson Pill:
Equality, Race, and Culture, 92 MICH L. REV. 2613 (1994) (imagining colloquies
among professors, judges, and citizens of various political orientations on
subject of fictional “Michael Jackson Pill,” which would remove all “blackness”
from black people).
[8]

For a discussion of the many difficulties faced by blacks in the corporate
world, see GEORGE DAVIS & GLEGG WATSON, BLACK LIFE IN CORPORATE AMERICA:
SWIMMING IN THE MAINSTREAM (1982).
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[9]

Throughout this Article, I treat “race” as a relatively stable category, and as a
construct with which the reader is familiar. I do so in large part because that
approach seems consistent with the conceptual terrain of Title VII. Nevertheless,
I find great explanatory power in the analysis of race as socially constructed. See
generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV.. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994); D. Marvin
Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437
(1993). . . .
[10]

Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970 (1993).
[11]

For a more complete exposition of the transparency thesis, see id. at 969–79.

[12]

Moreover, the criterion employed in Keisha’s case was subjective. Some
objective criteria of decision, such as scored tests or, in some contexts,
educational requirements, also may be characterized as transparently white, but
these are not the subject of this Article. The glass ceiling is maintained much
more frequently through the use of subjective bases of decision.
The form of discrimination Keisha experienced also may be labeled institutional
racism, defined as the maintenance of institutions that systematically advantage
whites. See JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 129–31 (1972). Treating an
Afrocentric personal identity as a negative factor in the decision whether to
promote an individual to a supervisory position systematically advantages
whites as a group over blacks, even though there may be significant numbers of
black persons like Yvonne who would not be adversely affected by the use of
that criterion. It should be noted, however, that institutional racism may take
conscious as well as unconscious forms; thus, the concept overlaps only partially
with the notion of transparently white criteria of decision because the latter by
definition are employed unconsciously.
Viewed from another angle, Keisha’s case is an instance of cultural domination.
See Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title
VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994). My approach to
Keisha’s story emphasizes the ways in which structural factors combine with the
impulse toward cultural domination to produce adverse employment outcomes
37
for nonwhites.

This first step was not doctrinally necessary, as Title VII allows a plaintiff to
state a claim whenever a criterion of decision has racially disparate effects in an
employment context. Given that I ultimately turned to racial disparities as the
38
central way to identify anything as white-specific, one could argue that
“transparently white” criteria really are nothing more than criteria that have a
disparate racial effect favoring whites. In turn, this line of thinking goes, there’s
no need to identify the criterion of decision in Keisha’s case as “white” (and on
that basis characterize the decision as one taken “because of” on race, thus
bringing it within the scope of Title VII); the existence of a racially disparate
effect alone suffices to trigger a Title VII analysis. I concede the point as a
doctrinal matter, though I never meant to suggest that the set of transparently
white criteria of decision is exactly coextensive with the set of criteria of decision

37.
38.

Flagg, supra note 1, at 2011–13 & nn.7–12 (alterations added).
Id. at 2040.
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that have racially disparate effects. At the same time, as Keisha’s claim likely
would not survive under existing disparate impact doctrine, it seemed to me
important to provide as many reasons as possible for constructing a new
disparate impact framework.
Even more importantly, for me the core undertaking of the article wasn’t
entirely, or even primarily, doctrinal. My central objective was to illuminate for
whites the invisibly raced nature of criteria, norms, and expectations that seem
to us race neutral. My decision to frame this project in doctrinal terms was
driven by a number of factors: That’s how one gets a good law review
placement, that’s how one demonstrates to certain colleagues that one can (or is
willing to) do doctrinal analysis, etc. But even then, I offered a “soft” account of
the doctrinal program:
I undertake this project of doctrinal construction with two objectives in view.
First, I hope to make the case that in Title VII and its 1991 amendments there are
conceptual strands that can be woven together to form a coherent theory of
liability for transparently white subjective decisionmaking. In addition, I offer
this analysis as an exercise in reflection—on the nature of the transparency
phenomenon and the nature of doctrinal formation, reciprocally. Exploring
transparency may tell us something about what race discrimination doctrine
might become, and examining doctrinal possibilities may tell us something
40
about who we want and choose to be.

Accordingly, my explanation that Keisha was “disadvantaged because of her
race” had much more to do with an “exercise in reflection” than with any
doctrinal recommendation.
My argument that Title VII could be read, in principle, to provide a legal
remedy for transparently white decisionmaking, the second step in my overall
project, turned on an examination of the notion of “equal opportunity.” I framed
the problem as a choice between pluralist and assimilationist interpretations of
that norm. My argument for the former interpretation had two components: I
contended that an assimilationist interpretation would fail to implement the
Title VII objective of eliminating race as a factor in employment, and that the
pluralist interpretation “is more fully aligned with the remedial goals of Title VII
41
than is the assimilationist interpretation.” For present purposes the former
argument is the more significant, and again I reproduce the entire text and
relevant footnotes:
Under the assimilationist conception of equal employment opportunity, Keisha
would be required to conform to the prevailing cultural norms in her
dominantly white workplace at least to the extent that those norms implicate
characteristics within her control. For example, grooming is generally thought to
be a matter of personal choice, and to the extent that it is, each employee has an
equal opportunity to conform to an employer’s grooming code, regardless of
[121]
race.
The decisionmakers in Keisha’s case could argue that she had been

39. For one thing, transparently white criteria by definition favor whites; clearly there are
criteria with racially disparate effects that favor other racial groups.
40. Flagg, supra note 1, at 2015.
41. Id. at 2033.
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afforded an equal opportunity to conform to analogous, but more subtle,
cultural norms.
This assimilationist position rests on a false dichotomy between race and
individual choice. For Keisha, the two are inextricably intertwined because the
aspects of personal identity implicated in the decision not to promote her are
race-dependent. Thus the “choice” with which she is faced is in effect a choice to
retain her racial identity as she understands it, or to renounce it. She would
describe herself as having to shed or disavow crucial facets of blackness, if she
[124]
wants to get ahead in her place of employment.
One might well argue in response, as could Keisha’s supervisors, that even if
Keisha experiences her personal qualities as linked with her race, in reality she
has not been denied employment opportunity on the basis of race because she
had the same chance as any white candidate to conform or be denied
advancement. One cannot measure the subjective discomfort entailed by such a
choice, the argument would go, and in any event subjective experience should
not be relevant. Individuals must make all sorts of choices in life, including the
choice whether to “fit in” to a particular environment. So long as the same
demands are placed on all employees regardless of race, the argument
continues, one should not say that race is a factor in a decision adversely
affecting the individual who chooses not to conform.
The foregoing argument is problematic because it reiterates the transparency
error. Because it underestimates the centrality of race to personal identity for
people who are not white, it incorrectly assumes that the identity costs of
conformity to the norms of a white cultural setting for a black person are
commensurate with the identity costs incurred by a white person required to
conform in the same setting.
Racial identity is not a central life experience for most white people, because it
does not have to be. Like members of any socially dominant group, white
people have the option to set aside consciousness of the characteristic that
defines the dominant class—in this case, race. Thus whiteness is experienced as
racelessness, and personal identity is conceived in a race-neutral manner.
However, race plays quite a different role in the lives of people of color in this
society. It is, again as a consequence of existing social structures that define and
give meaning to racial identity, a central facet of life. One black feminist, bell
hooks, describes her experience of race:
I often begin courses which focus on African-American literature, and
sometimes specifically black women writers, with a declaration by
Paulo Freire which had a profound liberatory effect on my thinking:
“We cannot enter the struggle as objects in order to later become
subjects.” This statement compels reflection on how the dominated, the
oppressed, the exploited make ourselves subject. How do we create an
oppositional worldview, a consciousness, an identity, a standpoint that
exists not only as that struggle which also opposes dehumanization but
as that movement which enables creative, expansive self-actualization?
Opposition is not enough. In that vacant space after one has resisted
there is still the necessity to become—to make oneself anew. Resistance
is that struggle we can most easily grasp. Even the most subjected
person has moments of rage and resentment so intense that they
respond, they act against. There is an inner uprising that leads to
rebellion, however short-lived. It may be only momentary but it takes
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place. That space within oneself where resistance is possible remains. It
is different then to talk about becoming subjects. That process emerges
as one comes to understand how structures of domination work in one’s
own life, as one develops critical thinking and critical consciousness, as
one invents new, alternative habits of being, and resists from that
[127]
marginal space of difference inwardly defined.
Thus, Keisha’s employer is simply wrong in thinking that its conformity
requirement is race-neutral; the standard places quite a different burden on
nonwhites than it does on white employees. Moreover, this difference is not
subjective, but structural. The social significance of race—the existence of a
racial hierarchy—guarantees that race will intrude on the self-consciousness of
[128]
nonwhites to an extent that most whites never will experience.
Thus the
hypothetical white candidate for promotion is unlikely to experience as racedependent the personal attributes called into question by her employer’s
workplace conformity rule. Even if she does experience these attributes as
associated with race, they are not likely to be for that reason central to her selfdefinition. For Keisha, on the other hand, conformity is excruciatingly difficult
precisely because it calls her racial identity into question.
Once one sees that race is inevitably implicated in matters of “personal choice,”
it becomes apparent that the assimilationist interpretation does not truly reflect
a conception of race-neutral employment opportunity. Under the assimilationist
interpretation, the mandate of equality is satisfied in Keisha’s case because she
could, in theory, conform to the employer’s expectations, even though doing so
necessarily would levy costs on her that are inseparably linked to her race. The
pluralist conception of equal opportunity embodies a more thoroughgoing
notion of race neutrality. This interpretation of equality would not hold the
requirements of equal opportunity to be satisfied unless the employer at least
explored ways of accommodating diverse, race-dependent means of achieving
legitimate business objectives. Thus only the pluralist interpretation of equal
opportunity can capture fully the vision of a workplace in which race does not
matter—in Title VII’s language, a workplace in which the individual is not
disadvantaged “because of” race.
[121]

See, e.g., Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(upholding employer’s prohibition of braided hairstyles). . . .
....

[124]

I reiterate that Yvonne also understands herself as black, though she has a
cultural style different from Keisha’s.
....

[127]

BELL HOOKS, The Politics of Radical Black Subjectivity, in YEARNING: RACE,
GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS 15, 15 (1990). Keisha’s Afrocentric personal
style may be seen as a move toward becoming “subject” in bell hooks’ sense.
[128]

I emphasize that I’m generalizing, but I do not claim that all whites fit the
description in the text, nor do I claim that all black people regard race as central
to self-identity in the ways Keisha and Yvonne do. On the dangers, and
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necessity, of essentialism, see ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN:
42
PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988).

Finally, the article set forth two models of Title VII liability each of which
might implement the pluralist vision of equal opportunity. The first of these was
the “foreseeable effects” model. This model tracked existing disparate impact
doctrine, but with important modifications. Under this approach, a plaintiff
could show the existence of a disparate effect by demonstrating that “an
unfavorable employment decision was based on lack of a characteristic more
43
frequently possessed by whites than by nonwhites . . . .” This modification of
the disparate effects requirement was intended to obviate some of the
difficulties associated with “small sample size, bottom-line impact[s], and
44
workforce statistics;” in that way it was designed to capture the ubiquity of
transparently white norms. In addition, the foreseeable effects approach
required that the business necessity defense be interpreted narrowly, in a non45
assimilationist manner.
The second model of Title VII liability explored in the article was called
“the alternatives model.” This approach departed from the familiar disparate
impact framework altogether. Instead,
[t]he plaintiff’s first step would be to analyze the racial structure of her
[169]
workplace.
A showing that the plaintiff’s place of employment is
predominantly white, or structured in such a way that whites predominate in
positions of authority, would trigger a presumption that the adverse action
rested on white-specific criteria of decision. However, that showing alone would
not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. The employer would have
to articulate the criterion employed in reaching the challenged decision, and the
objectives served by it, but the plaintiff would bear the burden of proposing an
alternative criterion that would serve the employer’s objective equally well, and
[170]
in a manner satisfactory to the plaintiff. Finally, the defendant would have an
opportunity to persuade the court that adopting the proposed alternative would
require unreasonable measures.
[169]

Like the foreseeable effects approach, this model would apply to a white
plaintiff in any situation in which nonwhites predominate and have final
authority over the management of the business, because by its terms Title VII
applies to any discrimination because of race. However, I think it exceptionally
rare for whites to find themselves in the position just described. But see Ray v.
University of Ark., 868 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (involving claim by sole
white officer on campus police force of University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff).

[170]

Placing the obligation of formulating a pluralist alternative on the plaintiff is
designed to ensure meaningful accommodation of cultural differences and to
give the outsider authority to determine what constitutes a satisfactory
46
accommodation.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 2034–36 & nn.121, 124, 127–28 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 2041.
Id. at 2041 n.155.
Id. at 2041–42.
Id. at 2044 & nn.169–70 (alterations added).
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The article concluded with a comparison of what I saw as the relative costs
and benefits of each, measured against the goal of providing a remedy for
transparently white decisionmaking in employment. I did not explicitly opt for
one over the other, though I did hint at a preference for the alternatives model.
The conclusion read as follows:
Keisha confronts a form of race discrimination that is as pervasive as it is
painful: the expectation that she must conform to norms that challenge her racial
sense of self if she is to succeed in her chosen career. I have argued in this Article
that though existing judicial interpretations of Title VII are not adequate to
respond effectively to Keisha’s case, the statute itself, as amended in 1991 and
read in light of its underlying objectives, is broad enough to encompass her
claim. The challenge, then, is to formulate a doctrinal framework tailored to the
task at hand but acceptable in light of other widely held normative expectations.
I have set forth two possible models of Title VII liability that would
accommodate Keisha’s claim, in the hope that they will generate further
47
exploration of possible doctrinal responses to institutional racism.

III. RESPONDING TO PROFESSOR FORD
In this section I engage with Professor Ford’s critique on three levels. I look
first at his specific references to me in the text of Racial Culture and argue that
each of them misrepresents my position in quite significant ways. Second, I
show that the general claims he makes about “rights-to-difference” proponents
do not apply to my Title VII article, because for each of Ford’s contentions there
is something in my article that disavows or at least problematizes the view that
he associates with “rights-to-difference.” One could say that these two
subsections are my own “negative program,” in which I take strong issue with
Ford’s representations of my work. However, I do have a positive program as
well. It is the case, as I will elaborate below, that my Title VII article relies in
important ways on a core norm of cultural pluralism. Professor Ford’s argument
that this is not the best foundation on which to build race discrimination law is
well taken; it is this proposition that prompts me to revisit Keisha’s claim. Thus
the final portion of this section will examine whether it is possible to refashion a
claim for Keisha, one that draws on anti-subordinationist norms rather than
pluralist ones.
A. Specific References
Professor Ford names me in the text of Racial Culture on six occasions,
though he quotes on those occasions just two phrases seemingly attributed to
me. The first of these is the phrase “racially correlated traits,” which appears
three times, two of them in quotation marks. In fact, I never used this phrase in
the Title VII article (nor in any other law review article). To be sure of this, I
used the Westlaw “Locate in Result” feature, which permits one to search for
specific strings of words within a selected law review article. This procedure
turned up no hits for “racially correlated traits,” “racially correlated trait,”
“racially correlated,” “traits,” “trait,” or “correlated.” (Just to be sure it was
47.

Id. at 2051.
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working properly, I tried “seamlessly,” which I know to be there, and that term
popped right up.)
Nevertheless, here’s what Ford says about the phrase “racially correlated
traits” in my work:
The simplest claim is that practices that “correlate” with group identity should
receive rights protection. For instance law professor Barbara Flagg argues for the
protection of “racially correlated traits,” while law professor Kenji Yoshino
argues for an approach to anti-discrimination law that “observe[s] correlations
48
between behavior and identity that exist in the world.”[citing to Yoshino only]
Rights-to-difference conceive of anti-discrimination law as an injunction to
ignore those individual characteristics that are plausibly, if controversially,
described as “elements” of a protected group identity. For instance Juan Perea
argues that discrimination against “ethnic traits” should be prohibited as such;
similarly Barbara Flagg’s [sic] proposes to prohibit discrimination against
“racially correlated traits,” whether or not such discrimination results in a
49
racially segregated or exclusive workplace.[citing to Flagg at 2025]
Many of the rights-to-difference proposals seem to envision a disparate
treatment claim in which certain traits would be defined as elements of a
protected identity: For instance Juan Perea argues that discrimination against
“ethnic traits” should be prohibited as disparate treatment because of the
difficulty of proving such discrimination in terms of its disparate impact on a
racial or national origin group; similarly Barbara Flagg’s proposal to prohibit
discrimination against racially correlated traits is designed to avoid the necessity
of demonstrating a statistically disparate impact.[citing again to Flagg, supra
50
note 1, at 2025]

Ford’s presentation makes it seem as if I set forth a doctrinal proposal under
which some traits of Keisha’s would receive legal protection because they
“correlate” with her racial identity. However, the phrase I actually used was
“characteristics associated with whites” (and some variants thereof, such as “a
facially neutral criterion . . . associated more closely with whites than with other
51
racial groups” ). This is not merely a semantic distinction. My “characteristics
associated with whites” differ in three very significant ways from “racially
correlated traits.” First, the characteristics I discuss are characteristics of whites,
not generic “racial” characteristics; second, they are characteristics of
decisionmakers, not of the persons disadvantaged by their use; and finally, they
include not only “[characteristics] that are biological in origin, but [also]
characteristics that are associated with whites as a consequence of the existing
social hierarchy of race, as well as differences that are more purely cultural in
52
origin.” Thus in my foreseeable effects model “characteristics associated with

48. Ford, supra note 5, at 60 (internal citations omitted and alterations added). Ford’s use of
quotation marks here is especially troubling, as the phrase attributed to Professor Yoshino does in
fact appear in his article, though I think it is taken out of context. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111
YALE L.J. 769, 934 (2002).
49. Id. at 97–98 (internal citations omitted).
50. Id. at 197 (internal citations omitted).
51. Flagg, supra note 1, at 2040.
52. Id. at 2040–41.
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whites” become a trigger for further analysis when they are used by white
53
decisionmakers in the workplace in ways that disadvantage persons of color.
This model would apply even if Keisha exhibited no traits associated with
54
blackness.
The second phrase Ford attributes to me is “personal characteristics that
intersect seamlessly with [one’s racial] self-definition,” and variants thereof. At
least this is a phrase I did actually use, though Ford again reads it in a manner
that is at best highly misleading. Here are his attributions on this front:
In 1995 Barbara Flagg suggested in the Yale Law Journal that Title VII should
prohibit discrimination on the basis of “personal characteristics [that] . . .
55
intersect seamlessly with [one’s racial] self definition.”[citing to Flagg at 2012]
[Describing another author:] This latter presumption reflects a psychological
conception of identity: here identity is a matter of a subjective and internal
development of a “sense of self” to which certain practices and beliefs become
central. Similarly, Barbara Flagg, [sic] argues for legal protection for traits that
“intersect seamlessly with [the plaintiff’s] self definition.”[citing to Flagg at
56
2012]
Barbara Flagg writes of traits that “intersect seamlessly with . . . self definition”:
57
a subjective, psychological theory of identity.[no citation]

I see now that the phrase “intersect seamlessly with . . . self definition”
might be confusing, though perhaps it would be less so if not taken out of
context. The complete sentence reads: “Nevertheless, it can be argued that she
too was disadvantaged because of her race, in that the personal characteristics
that disqualified her from a management position intersect seamlessly with her
58
self-definition as a black woman.” As explained in the previous section of this
essay, the discussion at that point in the article was directed at whites’ race
consciousness; it was intended to make whites more aware of the raced nature of
the decision, which otherwise might seem to rest on race-neutral norms and
expectations. Even so, I concede that the passage is a bit puzzling. On the one
hand, I made Keisha the arbiter of what it means to be a black woman (in order
to avoid racial essentialism). At the same time, I said that the raced nature of the
conformity standard is not subjective: “[T]he [conformity] standard places quite
53. Id.
54. Though it’s not the central focus here, I have to point out that Ford’s phrases “whether or
not such discrimination results in a racially segregated or exclusive workplace” and “is designed to
avoid the necessity of demonstrating a statistically disparate impact” also are misleading,
independently of the mistaken reading captured by “proposal to prohibit discrimination against
racially correlated traits.” At page 2025, I was describing existing doctrine, and I pointed out that
“the existing disparate impact plaintiff must have statistically significant evidence of racial
imbalance in the workforce.” I suppose, as I was describing doctrines that would function as barriers
to Keisha’s claim, that one could infer that I disapproved of this requirement. But it surely does not
follow that I was proposing some approach that would be entirely indifferent to whether a
workplace was “racially segregated or exclusive.” Indeed, if one looks at the alternatives model, one
finds a proposal precisely to the contrary, as described above. See supra text accompanying note 46.
55. Ford, supra note 5, at 11 (internal citation omitted).
56. Id. at 60 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).
57. Id. at 98 (alterations added).
58. Flagg, supra note 1, at 2012.
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a different burden on nonwhites than it does on white employees. . . . [T]his
difference is not subjective, but structural. The social significance of race—the
existence of a racial hierarchy—guarantees that race will intrude on the selfconsciousness of nonwhites to an extent that most whites never will
59
experience.” In fact, I think that identity, including racial identity, is formed
through a dialogue between self and society, a point I’ll explore more fully
60
below. This passage is at best an indistinct gesture in the direction of that sort
of theory of the social construction of self.
In any event, the passage in question plays no role in either of my models
of liability. The foreseeable effects model turns on the criterion of decision itself,
with no reference to the self definition costs it does or does not impose on an
adversely affected employee. In looking to structural considerations, the
alternatives model moves even further away from concern about self definition.
Neither model bears any resemblance that I can see to Ford’s account.
B. Generic References
As described in greater detail above, the principal elements of Ford’s
caricature of “rights-to-difference” proponents are claims that we (1) imagine
there is a very sharp difference between cultures (at one point labeled
61
“provincial multiculturalism”); (2) understand individual cultures to be
monolithic in nature, either in fact or ideally (so that, for instance, there is some
62
“authentic” black culture); (3) believe that individual identity preexists society;
63
it is neither socially constructed nor something that is performed; and (4)
understand legal rights to be negative rights only, having no positive or
64
constitutive function. Now, one might find it a bit uncharitable of me to make
the effort to distance myself from these generalizations, as I already have (I
hope) made the case that I never was a “rights-to-difference proponent” in
Ford’s sense of the term, but as I appear regularly in that role in Ford’s
presentation of his opponents, I think it worth a couple of paragraphs to
respond on this level as well.
The first two of these generic allegations can be dismissed relatively easily,
by reference to the text and notes of my article and the immediate implications
thereof. As mentioned earlier, the presence of Keisha’s sister Yvonne was
designed primarily to make it clear that I did not understand black culture to be
monolithic, and that I wished not to suggest that Keisha’s manner of presenting
65
herself as black was better or more “authentic” than alternative ways of being.
It seems to me that it also follows from one facet of the description of Yvonne
that I could not have envisioned a sharp divide between cultures: “[S]he sees
66
being black as congruent with many of the norms of the dominant culture.”
59. Id. at 2035.
60. See infra text accompanying note 87.
61. Ford, supra note 5, at 167–68.
62. Id. at 70.
63. Id. at 61.
64. Id. at 68.
65. See supra text accompanying note 35.
66. Flagg, supra note 1, at 2010 n.3.
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The question of “identity performance” is a bit more complicated. I, at least,
did not have this vocabulary in 1995, but I think that my presentation of Keisha
falls within that general frame of thought. First, there is the characterization of
67
Yvonne and Keisha as “interpreting” blackness. Second, there is the implicit
claim that there is no such thing as a “raceless” individual choice; the meaning
of any particular choice is given in part by the cultural context in which it is
made. At the same time, I do think there is something that can be described as
68
choice (witness the differing personal choices made by Keisha and Yvonne).
This adds up, I think, to a picture of identity-in-social-context; something that is
69
quite congruent with Ford’s account of identity as social performance. In any
70
case, I think there certainly is enough openness in the text to make Ford’s
caricature inapposite.
Finally, there is the question of the role and impact of legal rights. I
reiterate that I did not advance any doctrinal proposal in the usual sense; I set
forth two possibilities “as an exercise in reflection—on the nature of the
transparency phenomenon and the nature of doctrinal formation, reciprocally.
Exploring transparency may tell us something about what race discrimination
doctrine might become, and examining doctrinal possibilities may tell us
71
something about who we want and choose to be.” It seems to me that this
passage has more than a little in common with one of Ford’s: “As policy, legal
entitlements in general and especially rights do not simply protect people from
outside interference; they also channel energies and shape perceptions about
what is important, necessary and good in life. Rights have a tutelary function;
72
they send a message about what society values.” Too much congruence, I
think, to justify saddling me with the “negative rights only” label.
C. Refashioning Keisha’s Claim
If my “proposals” do not aim to protect a general “right to difference,” they
73
do envision some sort of “right,” held by people of color, not to be white. I
suppose this is some variety of “right to difference,” though it is not the variety
Ford describes. It is not primarily a right to “cultural difference,” though it
would encompass cultural differences between whites and people of color when
that difference was implicated by a white-specific criterion of decision. Beyond cultural
difference, the “proposals” contemplate a form of protection for all types of
racial difference from whiteness, whether having to do with physical
characteristics, status differences, or any other form of “difference.” The key is
67. Id. at 2010 n.3, 2011 n.4.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 29–32.
69. See Ford, supra note 5, at 61–64.
70. After all, the article is not about “identity.”
71. Flagg, supra note 1, at 2015.
72. Ford, supra note 5, at 69.
73. At this point it might be useful to distinguish between a “claim”—a term I use in this essay
to encompass both moral claims and legal rights—and a “right”—by which I mean only a legal right.
The distinction makes some difference in that I am quite sure that Keisha has a claim in the moral
sense, but I’m not completely sure whether its best expression is in the form of a legal right. This
essay does not grapple with that question, but seeks only to refashion the proposals set forth in my
1995 article.
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the use by whites of criteria that seem to them “neutral,” but which in fact
operate to favor whites.
Even so, my Title VII article clearly implicates an underlying norm of
cultural pluralism, at least some of the time. References to the concept are
74
scattered throughout the piece. The clearest illustration of the point can be
found in my discussion of Title VII’s underlying values, while the presentation
of the models of liability tells a more complicated story, though one also in
which culture makes an appearance.
I framed the question of interpreting Title VII’s “equal opportunity” as a
choice between assimilation and pluralism, the latter of which might be read
more broadly than “cultural pluralism.” However, the ensuing discussion
focused almost entirely on cultural assimilation and diversity. Thus, to point to
the most egregious example, the analysis featured Keisha’s grooming choices,
and began in this way: “Under the assimilationist conception of equal
employment opportunity, Keisha would be required to conform to the
prevailing cultural norms in her dominantly white workplace at least to the
75
extent that those norms implicate characteristics within her control.” This
discussion centered on the “identity costs of conformity to the norms of a white
76
cultural setting.” I think there can be no question that this section rested on
77
conceptions of cultural diversity and assimilation.
However, both models of liability moved away from any emphasis on
notions of cultural difference, each referring back to more ambiguous concepts
of “pluralism” and “assimilation.” In the section that set forth the foreseeable
impact model I discussed what it means for a criterion of decision to be “white.”
In so doing, I made it clear that the criteria under consideration would not be
limited to the realm of cultural differences:
[The requirement] that a facially neutral criterion be associated more closely
with whites than with other racial groups if it is to be considered white-specific,
is a broad requirement that implicates a wide range of characteristics that might
be distributed unevenly across races. It includes criteria that are biological in
origin, but extends equally to characteristics that are associated with whites as a
consequence of the existing social hierarchy of race, as well as to differences that
[151]
are more purely cultural in origin.
The requirement is easily satisfied; one
need only show that the criterion of decision in question is one that occurs more
frequently among whites than among other racial groups.
[151]

In an earlier article I described a black woman named C.W., who had been
denied supervisory positions at a bank because she was less assertive than
supervisors were expected to be. This characteristic might be the result of
adaptation to racial hierarchy, or it might be simply a matter of cultural
78
style. . . .

74. See generally Flagg, supra note 1.
75. Id. at 2034.
76. Id.
77. It didn’t have to. See infra text accompanying note 93.
78. Flagg, supra note 1, at 2040 & n.151 (citing Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race,
Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 935, 971–72 (1994)) (alterations added).
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At the same time, with regard to the business necessity defense I said: “Because
the focus here is the problem of assimilationism, this defense should be
interpreted narrowly to exclude justifications that reproduce assimilation in
79
another form.” If one reads this sentence in the context of the immediately
preceding pages, one might see in it a broad notion of “assimilation,” but in the
context of the broader Title VII discussion, it takes on a more restricted
connotation having to do with cultural assimilation.
Similarly, I presented the alternatives model as a reflection of institutional
or structural discrimination:
The alternatives model mirrors the institutional nature of some forms of race
discrimination. Keisha’s claim, for example, is structural in the sense that it is
the consequence of a particular workforce composition and the nature of white
[175]
race consciousness. Therefore, it seems only natural to construct a doctrinal
framework that reflects the structural character of this theory of liability, and
thus disavow the intent-like connotations of the existing disparate impact
approach. The alternatives model permits the plaintiff who has been
disadvantaged by institutionally race-specific features of the workplace to rely
on general knowledge about this form of race specificity, and to proceed directly
80
to the exploration of more inclusive employment practices.

However, footnote 175, in the middle of this passage, links structural
discrimination with “cultural dominance”:
[175]

In a workforce that is predominantly white, the tendency of whites to be
unaware of the whiteness of facially neutral criteria is exacerbated; in effect,
certain structures inevitably produce cultural dominance. However, I agree with
the many theorists who maintain that cultural dominance is a powerful force
with or without structural reinforcement. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
81
BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); Culp, supra note [7].

Though “cultural dominance” might as easily be tied to concepts of racial
subordination as to notions of pluralism, the reference to “culture” here likely
muddies the waters.
In sum, I think it entirely fair to say that my Title VII article moved rather
indiscriminately between notions of cultural discrimination, status hierarchy,
and structural and institutional discrimination. Against this, consider Professor
Ford’s admonition: “[O]pposition to discrimination based on status does not
imply opposition to discrimination based on culture. There is no normative
inconsistency in a position that staunchly rejects hierarchies of status while
82
adopting a stance of diffidence, ambivalence or indifference as to culture.”
I entirely agree with Ford that there is a very important distinction to be
made between status hierarchy (and the actions, including but not limited to
discrimination, that reinforce it) and cultural difference (and the protection, or
not, of cultural difference). It is this reminder that has prompted me to revisit
Keisha’s claim. However, I find that I am not in complete agreement with Ford

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2041–42.
Id. at 2045–46.
Id. at 2045 n.175.
Ford, supra note 5, at 93 (alterations added).

05__FLAGG.DOC

2/8/2007 2:02 PM

AN ESSAY FOR KEISHA

201

on several points ancillary to this central one. I’ll explore those areas of
disagreement before turning to the refashioning of Keisha’s claim.
Ford takes the position that:
[P]olitical solidarity based on a common relationship to oppression and
domination is the appropriate focus of (racial) identity politics and legal rights
assertion; by contrast cultural claims are more contestable on both descriptive
and normative terms and should be left to more fluid domains of conflict
resolution such as social dialogue, the democratic process and the market
83
economy.

Along with the distinction between oppression-based claims and cultural ones,
it seems that Ford draws a relatively bright line between cultural practices and
ascriptive identity: “there is no necessary correspondence between the ascribed
84
identity of race and one’s culture or personal sense of self.” Moreover, he states
explicitly that he sees ascriptive identity as immutable:
Race and other ascriptive identities aren’t like religious affiliations because
membership is not chosen by the member or conferred or withheld by the
group—it is imposed by society at large. The Congressional Black Caucus can’t
kick Clarence Thomas or Ward Connerly out of the black club and they can’t
85
quit.

I disagree with each of these propositions. I don’t reject all legal protections
for cultural difference for two reasons. First, I can imagine some acceptable
forms of legal protection for the cultures of indigenous peoples. Second, with
respect to non-indigenous groups, I can envision a degree of protection for
cultural difference because (and when) I see it as intertwined with other aspects
of identity, such as ascriptive status. Because I don’t see ascribed, cultural, or
other aspects of identity as distinct from one another in the way Ford does,
addressing status hierarchy may well take the form of protection of cultural
86
difference.
For example, if we consider Keisha, ascription (“black woman”), status
(color stigmatization), resistance to it, and culture (her “Afrocentric
interpretation of blackness”) all flow into one another; I don’t think they can be
neatly separated. All exist—are formed and performed—in interaction with the
larger culture in which she lives, and also in interaction with the variegated
87
black culture Ford so aptly describes. In short, I see identity as complex and
dialogic, and I don’t believe the ascriptive strand can be neatly separated from
the others.
I also take issue with Ford’s assertion that ascriptive status is something
entirely given by society. Historians tell us that is not the case; the content of

83. Id. at 20 (alteration added).
84. Id. at 117.
85. Id.
86. I accept Ford’s basic distinction between anti-subordination norms and cultural pluralism
but reject his rigid distinction between ascribed and cultural identity because while the former is a
matter of theory, the latter has to do with the real world, in which, in my experience, there rarely are
tidy or absolute distinctions.
87. See Ford, supra note 5, at 23–27.
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ascriptive categories changes over time even within a given culture, but there
also is reason to think that individuals sometimes migrate from one category to
88
another, and not always by passing. Moreover, this image of a fixed, entirely
socially-given ascriptive identity seems at odds with Ford’s own conception of
89
identity as performance.
Now, all of this has to do with the ways one theorizes race; there is no
“fact” here, and, in that sense, no right or wrong. Thus I’m not going to argue
that my view is correct and Ford’s isn’t, or even that my way of thinking about
race is better in these respects (I’d define “better” by reference to a theory’s
prospects of contributing to genuine racial justice). Rather, I just wanted to
clarify my position on these questions as a context for the reconstruction of
Keisha’s claim.
I begin with what I really think happened in Keisha’s case. She was denied
a promotion because of a package of characteristics that, for the white people
who were making the decision, added up to her being “too different” from the
90
employees she would supervise to be a department head. The package in
question consisted of dress and grooming choices, use of nonstandard English at
times, and unfamiliar (to the white decisionmakers) views on race. Even at the
time, and most certainly now, I was and am inclined to read this decision as
having more to do with preserving racial hierarchy than with “difference,”
conceived as something that pertains among equals. That is, Keisha presents an
image of resistance to white supremacy (admittedly, she herself is a bit of a
caricature). Were this a real life event (as it easily could be), I would strongly
suspect that it was just too much of a challenge to white dominance—dignitary,
material, and cultural—for the white decisionmakers to be willing to place any
real power in Keisha’s hands.
I don’t imagine that the whites who made the decision in Keisha’s case
thought about the problem in terms of power and privilege; even less do I
imagine that they saw themselves as keeping a black woman “in her place,” or
91
that they harbored any animus toward Keisha. Rather, for me the point of
analyzing instances of transparently white decisionmaking is to expose the very
subtle ways in which white privilege can and does reproduce itself. There is no
animus here, nor any intent to discriminate. There is just the desire to keep
things as they are, which becomes problematic only when we focus on the fact
that “the way things are” centrally involves a well developed, though
suppressed, racial hierarchy.
Thus Keisha’s claim properly rests on anti-subordinationist norm, rather
92
than a norm of cultural pluralism. And, just as her moral claim is a claim
88. See, e.g., Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule,
1600–1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007): Ian F. Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race:
Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
89. See Ford, supra note 5, at 61–64.
90. Flagg, supra note 1, at 2011.
91. Ford seems to limit status discrimination to discrimination based on animus, though he
does at one point acknowledge a limited form of “subconscious” discrimination. See Ford, supra note
5, at 191.
92. I think I went in the direction I did in part because I tended to collapse differing norms
supporting racial redistribution (of various kinds), and partly because, of the seemingly available
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against racial hierarchy, it would be possible to construct a legal remedy for
Keisha that was designed to combat racial subordination. I close this essay by
considering, briefly, the contours of such a remedy for transparently white
decisionmaking in the workplace, reiterating that these proposals are “exercises
in reflection on who we want to be.”
As we are speaking of private employers, one needs some sort of statutory
anchor for such a right. I think it’s entirely possible to interpret Title VII in this
way. One would argue that “equal opportunity” requires the dismantling of
93
racial caste. (It’s possible, for example, to read Griggs v. Duke Power Co. in this
way, though one has to admit that the time for that sort of judicial interpretation
has passed.) But the key ingredient isn’t a clever legal argument interpreting the
statute; it’s the will to interpret the statute in this way. Or more generally, the
needed ingredient is the will of white people to actually dismantle racial
privilege.
But assuming we—or some authoritative legal institution (it has happened
before)—do make some anti-subordinationist commitment, in our culture we’d
need a legal doctrine with which to implement it. I think that both of the models
set forth in the 1995 article would work well enough, because they really are
doctrinal structures designed to put the relevant norms into play. Thus
substitution of an anti-subordinationist norm for a pluralist one, at appropriate
points, is all that is needed. With respect to the “foreseeable effects” model, the
1995 test for the first prong, the existence of a foreseeable impact, clearly
94
encompasses more than cultural difference. In the discussion of the business
necessity defense one could substitute “subordination” for “assimilation,” such
that the defense should be interpreted narrowly to exclude justifications that
95
reproduce, or contribute to, racial subordination. Along similar lines, the
alternatives model fairly easily could be made to resonate with antisubordinationism. The most difficult part would be to replace the suggested
96
“reasonable accommodation” approach to balancing the respective interests.
Something along the lines of a balance that took into account the nature of the
challenged action and the purpose for which it was taken, along with the nature
and degree of structural inequality in the workplace, probably would be
necessary to reflect the focus on anti-subordinationist norms. However, even
lacking an established doctrinal concept analogous to “accommodation” (which
I attribute to the fact that the law rarely goes very far down the antisubordinationist path), because the “foreseeable effects” model sounds in
difference, rendered problematic in new ways by Ford’s commentary, I now
have an even stronger preference than before for the alternatives model.

alternatives, I wanted to select one that I saw as enjoying some degree of popular support. Unlike
anti-subordination, cultural pluralism had (and apparently still has) some cachet.
93. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
94. Flagg, supra note 1, at 2040–41.
95. Cf. id. at 2042 (“[T]his defense should be interpreted narrowly to exclude justifications that
reproduce assimilation in another form.”) (alteration added).
96. Id. at 2047.
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Let me spell out again how the alternatives model would work. In any
97
place of employment dominated by whites, any person of color affected by an
adverse employment decision would have an opportunity to require the
employer to articulate the criterion used and the reason for using it. The
adversely affected employee then could propose an alternative, less
discriminatory means of reaching the stated objective, the employer could argue
that adopting the proposed alternative would not be reasonable, and the balance
between the two would ultimately be resolved by a court, if necessary. But the
process of “bargaining in the shadow of the law” might well mean that most
cases would be resolved by mutual agreement between the employer and the
employee. It seems to me that giving nonwhite employees the ability, backed up
by law, to initiate conversations about nondiscriminatory ways of doing things
is a step toward the redistribution of racial power. It looks to me something like
the way things ought to be.

97. A white-dominated workplace is one in which “nonwhites constitute less than roughly
fifteen percent of the workforce”; “is racially stratified, with whites occupying all or nearly all of the
upper-level positions”; or “a significant percentage of ostensibly managerial positions are occupied
by nonwhites, but in which whites wield most or all of the ultimate policymaking authority.” Id. at
2046. I think I would add to this list a racially segregated workplace, under circumstances in which
whites were responsible for the segregation.

